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The range and reachofGoverning theWorld ismuchwider than theprevious volume.
This is not a book about well-known and studied internationalist ideas and projects
only. In the course of his investigation,Mazower not only covers the luminaries but
also the internationalist thinkers and leaders lost to history. As a historian, Mark
Mazower’s emphasis onpersonalities as the creators of internationalist ideas and the
leaders of internationalist projects alsomakes one realize how little import we give
to individuals in social sciences. In most contemporary analytical schools studying
international politics unique individuals are reduced to political actors behaving in
an identical way, calculating their interests, and honing their tactics.
The main problem with Governing the World is that, at 475 pages, it is a little too
long. Most of it is a very interesting read, as it takes stock of most intellectual, ideo-
logical, political, and regulatory internationalist currents – big and small – of the
last twohundred years. Butwith somemerciless editing, the book could have been a
good100pages shorter andstillmake the samepointswith the samedegreeof rigour.
Mazower never spells it out in explicit form, but themain lesson that emerges from
this tome is one of sober reﬂection and realistic expectations about how the world
works. Failure to recognize the complexity of human affairs, and the limits of our
ability to instantly change theworld through immediate social engineeringnotonly
came to disappoint the self-appointed leaders of the brave new world, but also un-
leashedhumanmiseryon thosewhobelieved in the inﬂatedpromises of the experts.
Jan Erk∗




A few years ago, Olivier De Schutter, UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food,
wrote how the dissemination of the European Social Charter (ESC) through re-
search and teachingwould ‘contribute to the building of amore social and inclusive
Europe’.1 LeDroit International Social:Droits E´conomiques, Sociaux etCulturels, editedby
Jean-Marc Thouvenin and Anne Trebilcock, will facilitate this dissemination in the
francophone world, and will constitute a valuable tool for all those who intend to
teach, research, and study international and European social law. Solving ‘problems
of a social character’ is part and parcel of the raison d’eˆtre of the United Nations.2
Yet, the social dimensions of international law occupy a modest place within in-
ternational legal education and research. While most law schools teach aspects of
human rights law as part of their basic international law modules, this does not
automatically mean that students are introduced to international social law in any
∗ Leiden University [erk@fsw.leidenuniv.nl].
1 O. De Schutter (ed.), The European Social Charter: A Social Constitution for Europe (2010), at 1.
2 United Nations Charter, Art. 1(3).
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systematic way. For instance, most students in Europe will be familiar with the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) or the basic sources of European
Union law, but it is much less certain that they are aware of the ECHR’s sister treaty,
the ESC.
The reviewed two-volume work attempts to counter the relative oversight of
social law in current international law. It provides a detailed examination of the
history, sources,andsubstanceof theinternationalsocial lawfromtheestablishment
of the International Labour Organization (ILO) to the present day. Published in
French by Bruylant, the book provides a massive wealth of information for those
who are looking for an overview of international and European social law.
The editors of Le Droit International Social have compiled a comprehensive 2,072
page overview of international social law and economic, social, and cultural rights
(ESCR). Many of the more than 70 contributors are academics (most of them based
in Paris), while others are experts from UN agencies, the ILO, or the World Trade
Organization.Thework isco-ordinatedbytheCentredeDroit InternationaldeNanterre,
and the editors asked the contributors to examine whether international social law
is more programmatic than obligatory, more soft law than hard law. The overall
answer provided throughout the two volumes is that international social law is
efﬁcient and that states have been willing to be bound to various obligations in the
social realm despite recent tendencies to disengage (p. 96).
After a general introduction, Volume I focuses on the history, speciﬁcities, and
actors of international social law. Readers who are interested in social law but
relatively new to the international legal system in general will ﬁnd this volume
particularly useful. Volume II extensively dealswith the various speciﬁc obligations
of international social law. Sevendetailed chapters are dedicated to social law ratione
materiae: work, social security, health, the right to an adequate standard of living,
and the protection and assistance of families, education, science, and culture, aswell
as leisure, tourism, and sports.
The main strength of the two volumes is that they provide a tour d’horizon of
the actors, history, and substance of the social rights dimensions of contemporary
international law. The editors appropriately begin the book by situating social law
within public international law (p. 31). By emphasizing that social law is part of
general international law as a whole and by presenting the manifold interactions
between international social law and national jurisdictions, the contributors justify
why social law deserves to be treated by international law textbooks and teaching
on the same footing as other international law topics.
‘International social law’ is not easy to deﬁne and it is interesting to note what
the editors consider to be part of international social law. Social law is sometimes
understood to be limited to the body of law dealing with social security and labour
law. The book reviewed here takes a much broader approach.3 Thouvenin and
3 This is also the approach of a statute book that recently appeared on the French market – published
by another publisher within the Belgian Groupe De Boeck: Achim Seifert, Code de Droit Social Europe´en et
International, Brussels, Larcier, 2012.An innovative aspect of theLarcierCode is theprominentplace allocated
to instruments that attempt to regulate the behaviour of multinational enterprises.
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Trebilcock explain that their deﬁnition of social law includes ‘its economic, social
and cultural aspects’ (p. 26). As the subtitle of their book reveals, the editors consider
all ESCR to be part of social law. The editors clarify that they came up with this
deﬁnition by ‘following the footsteps of the drafters of the International Covenant
on ESCR of 1966’ (p. 26). Hence, they imply that international social law is deﬁned
with reference to all the rights mentioned in the Covenant on ESCR (p. 26). The
editors justify the subsumption of all ESCR within their deﬁnition of social law by
explaining that these rights have ‘an eminently social preoccupation’ (p. 26).
There are pros and cons to such a deﬁnition of international social law. On the
one hand, the deﬁnition is pragmatic. It ensures that the book appeals to those who
are primarily interested in labour and social security law as well as those who have
an interest in ESCR more broadly. In addition, deﬁning social law as essentially
the same as ESCR is not an invention of the editors if one considers the example
of the ESC which only refers to social rights in its title, but also contains many
economic and some cultural rights. On the other hand, the idea that social law is
distinguishable from other bodies of law because it has a ‘social preoccupation’ is a
potentially problematic suggestion with theoretical implications. While the above
is certainly correct about ESCR, could it not be said that all human rights (or even
legal norms in general) have a social preoccupation – at least depending on one’s
interpretation of the old maxim ubi societas ibi jus? If law is indispensable to every
society, law in general has ‘a social preoccupation’.What the difﬁculties of deﬁning
social law or social rights seem to conﬁrm ﬁrst and foremost is that putting human
rights into boxes is analytically unsatisfactory yet hard to avoid for publication
purposes. At the same time, another difﬁculty with the editors’ explanations is that
deﬁning social lawby reference to a collective social preoccupationmay cement the
view that there are distinct sets of human rights.
As iswell known, ESCRhave longbeen (and for somecontinue tobe) considered a
separate categoryofhumanrights that is legallydistinct fromtheir civil andpolitical
counterparts. It is regrettable that the various contributors to the twovolumesmake
contradictory statements with regard to the longstanding debate on the nature of
social rights. According toMarjorie Beulay, author of an introductory section on the
evolution of international social law, the social preoccupation of social law implies
that social rights are inherently distinct from other human rights:
Pre´sente´s e´galement comme des droits de deuxie`me ge´ne´ration, les droits sociaux sont des droits-
cre´ances c’est-a`-dire des « droits a` ». ( . . . ) En effet, l’optique est diffe´rente de celle des droits
civils et politiques: l’homme est place´ au centre d’une collectivite´, il n’est plus seulement envisage´
comme une entite´ individuelle mais e´galement comme la composante d’un ensemble au sein
duquel il dispose de droits notamment au regard de sa condition mate´rielle et dans la relation
qu’il entretient avec la socie´te´. (p. 66)4
4 ‘Also called second generations rights, social rights are “claims on the state”. ( . . . ) Indeed, the perspective is
different from the one for civil and political rights: the individual is placed in the centre of a community. [He
or she] is no longer seen as a single entity but as a component of a whole in which the individual has rights
related to his or her material condition and in his [or her] relationship with society.’ (p. 66) (Translation by
the author).
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This description of social rights is contradicted by other contributionswithin the
reviewed book. The UN Committee on ESCR, a considerable number of domestic
and regional decisions, andmany academic commentators have long argued, and in
some instances demonstrated in practice, that social rights impose negative as well
as positive obligations and that they are also individual rights. Many ESCR oblig-
ations have to be progressively realised over time and give considerable discretion
to each state about how best to achieve such realisation depending on the avail-
able resources. However, it is incorrect to derive from the emphasis on progressive
realisation that ESCR exclusively contain positive obligations and that this would
inherently distinguish them from other human rights. Trebilcock, for instance,
explains later in the book how states have the obligation to respect social rights, un-
derstoodas thenegativeduty to refrain frominterferingwithan individual’s existing
access to the enjoyment of rights (p. 106). The same is repeated byother contributors
(e.g. p. 855 or various discussions of negative aspects of ESCR, such as the explicit
treatment of the negative obligations related to the right to health on p. 1627 ff).
Last but not least, one could have hoped that vocabulary dividing human rights
into ‘generations’wasno longer employed. Invariousplaces, ESCRare called ‘second
generation rights’ (e.g. p. 66, 68, 224, and 852). The generational analogy has fallen
into disrepute with many human rights scholars or practitioners as it seems to
presume the prioritisation of civil and political rights (the so-called ﬁrst generation
rights) and the idea that ESCR are less well established in positive international
law. The classiﬁcation has been rightfully criticized for being ‘inconsistent with the
principles of universality, indivisibility and interdependence of human rights’ and
for assuming that human rights are exclusively the product of post-enlightenment
Western liberal thought.5
These shortcomings aside, Le Droit International Social is undoubtedly among
the most exhaustive francophone presentations of international social law to the
present day and the editors successfully offer a diversity of topics and international
sources relevant for theprotectionof the individual’s socialwell-being.A timely and
welcome addition to the literature, the two volumes will be of interest to advanced
law students, lawyers, ofﬁcials at government agencies, professors, and researchers
who are looking for a detailed exposition of the history, content, and sources of
international social law, how it interacts with domestic jurisdictions, and what
potential it has to contribute to one of the fundamental aims of the United Nations
by ‘solving problems of a social character’.
Evelyne Schmid∗
5 See, e.g., J.Mubangizi, ‘TowardsaNewApproachto theClassiﬁcationofHumanRightswithSpeciﬁcReference
to the African Context’, (2004) 4African Human Rights Law Journal 93, at 93, 97.
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